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NOTES

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE STORM
PRECEDING THE COMPROMISE OF
AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Equal opportunity in the workplace for all Americans is an unquestionable goal of the federal government.' Unfortunately, significant differences in opinion exist among our lawmakers regarding the
interpretation and implementation of this desirable result. Civil
Rights has been a subject of intense controversy since the United
1. Numerous bills have been introduced by the Senate, House of Representatives, and
Administration which seek to amend civil rights law, and in particular, employment discrimination law. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC., SI018 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (introducing the Civil
Rights Act of 1990 in the Senate); H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H364
(daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (introducing the Civil Rights Act of 1990 in the House); S. 2104,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CoNe.REC. H9552-55 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990) [hereinafter "S.
2104"] (all references are to the final conference committee version, dated Oct. 12, 1990,
unless otherwise noted); S. 3239, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. S18,046-48 (daily ed.
Oct. 24, 1990) (introducing the Administration's version of the bill in the Senate after the veto
of S. 2104); H.R. 5095, 136 CONG. REc. H13,551-53 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (introducing
the Administration's version of the bill in the House after the veto of S. 2104); H.R. 1, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (text in LEXIS, Genfed library, Bills file) (introducing on Jan. 3, the
first version of the Civil Rights Act of 1991); H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC.
H3922-28 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) [hereinafter "H.R. I"] (as of Oct. 1, 1991 the Brooks-Fish
substitute remains the sixth and final version of the bill in the House of Representatives and
further references will to version 6 of H.R. I unless otherwise noted); H.R. 1375, 102d Cong.,
IstSess., 137 CONG. REC. H1662-64 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1991) [hereinafter "H.R. 1375"]
(introducing the Administration's version of the Civil Rights Act of 1991); S. 611, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S3022-23 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1991) [hereinafter "S.611 "]
(introducing the Administration's version of the Civil Rights Act of 1991). H.R. 1375 and S.
611 are virtually identical and further references will be to the House bill. See also S. 1745,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (text in LEXIS, legis library, Bills file) [hereinafter "S. 1745"]
(introducing on Sept. 24 the Senate's version of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
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States Supreme Court's 1989 Term.2 On February 7, 1990, the Civil
Rights Act of 1990' (S. 2104 and H. R. 4000) was introduced in

both the Senate and the House of Representatives for the purposes
of revising Title VIP of the Civil Rights Act of 19645 and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.8 Eight months and hundreds of hours of debating later, both Houses passed identical versions of the legislation.7
Regrettably, on October 22, 1990, President George Bush became
the third President in American history to veto civil rights legislation
of paramount importance to our nation.8 Two days later, in the Bill's
final chance for life, the Senate failed to override the Presidential
veto, 66 to 34, only one vote shy of the necessary two-thirds
majority.'
Among the many reforms that the Civil Rights Act of 1990
would have achieved, its most significant contribution would have
been a response to the recent restrictive interpretation of employment discrimination laws by reversing, in whole or substantial part,
six of the Supreme Court's bare majority decisions during its 1989
Term. 10 Wards Cove Packing Company v. Atonio"l; Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins 2 ; Martin v. Wilks"; Lorance v. AT&T
2. A majority of this Note will be devoted to assessing the impact of the Court's 1989
Term on employment discrimination law. In addition, the discussion will focus on how and
why several of the Court's decisions need to be wholly or partially overturned by new civil
rights legislation. For a listing of the major cases at issue, see infra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
3. See 136 CONG. REC. S1018 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990); 136 CONG. REC. H364 (daily
ed. Feb. 7, 1990).
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
5. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h(6) (1988).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(1988).
7. See S. 2104, supra note 1, 136 CONG. REc. H9552-55. The Civil Rights Act of 1990
was drafted for the purposes of:
(1) respond[ing] to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring the civil
rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions; and
(2) strengthen[ing] existing protections and remedies available under Federal civil
rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and adequate compensation for victims of discrimination.
Id. at 9552.
8. See 136 CONG. REC. S16,457 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990).
9. See 136 CONG. REC. S16,562 (daily ed. Oct. 24 1990).
10. See S. 2104, supra note 1, § 2(b)(1), 136 Cong. Rec. at H9552.
11. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See infra notes 78-96 and accompanying text (formulating a
new burden and standard of proof for the justification of an employer's business practice after
a prima facie case of disparate impact is established by the plaintiff).
12. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). See infra notes 150-160 and accompanying text (holding that
if an employer can show that he would have made the same employment decision even in the
absence of a discriminatory motive, he will not be held liable although he also possessed illegitimate reasons for his decision).
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Technologies1 4 ; Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 5 ; and Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes 6 severely hindered

the ability of victims of employment discrimination to invoke federal
civil rights protections. Moreover, the Bill addressed such subjects as

compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination, jury trials, counsel fees, expert witness fees, and the statute

of limitations applicable in Title VII cases.' The overall impact of
the Bill would have overturned or modified approximately fifteen of
the Supreme Court's decisions since the mid-1970's.18 The Civil

Rights Act of 1990 was the troubled voice of Congress indicating
that the Court had forgotten the decades of struggle against the pen-

etrating force of racism and sexism in the American workplace.
The veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 prompted the sharpest
criticism that President Bush has endured from women, blacks and
other minorities since taking office.' In a three page veto message to
Congress, Bush stated that "despite the use of the term 'civil rights'

in the title of S. 2104, the bill actually employs a maze of highly
legalistic language to introduce the destructive force of quotas into

our Nation's employment system. S. 2104 creates powerful incentives for employers to adopt hiring and promotion quotas."20 President Bush, heeding the advice of his own civil rights commission and
the counsel of state attorney generals, Dick Thornburgh and C. Boy13. 490 U.S. 754 (1989). See infra notes 176-190 and accompanying text (deciding that
individuals who are not parties to an employment discrimination consent decree, that contain
racial preferences, may attack the decree in a subsequent action).
14. 490 U.S. 900 (1989). See infra notes 211-218 and accompanying text (stating that
the statute of limitations for challenging a facially neutral, but intentionally discriminatory,
seniority system begins to run from the date that the system was adopted, not from the date
that the system was applied in fact to the individual plaintiff).
15. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). See infra notes 244-252 and accompanying text (determining
that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 applies only in the making and not during the performance of contracts,
such as in the instance of on-the-job racial harassment).
16. 491 U.S. 754 (1989) (holding that expert witness fees are generally not recoverable
as part of costs).
17. See S. 2104, supra note 1, §§ 7, 8, 9, 10, 136 CONG. REC. at H9553-54.
18. See supra notes 11-16 (listing the six major cases at issue); see also Crawford Fittings Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986);
Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985);
Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981); Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250
(1980); New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); United Air Lines Inc., v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
19. See The Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 1990, § 1, at Al.
20. 136 CONG. REc. S16,457 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990). For a further discussion of the
Administration's concern regarding the possible implementation of hiring and promotion quotas see infra note 38 and accompanying text.
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den Gray, outlined the defects that made S. 2104 unacceptable.2
Although the congressional majority and the Administration were on
common ground regarding several of the Bill's important provisions,
they differed on many other crucial issues, including the specificity
of evidence needed to create a presumption of discrimination,22 the
legal standard of "business necessity, '2 3 the ability to challenge consent decrees,' the question of damages, 2 5 and the recovery of attorneys fees. 26 President Bush urged lawmakers to promptly pass his
alternative bill which he offered to Congress on October 20, 1990.17
He maintained that his version of the Civil Rights Act would protect
workers without imposing quotas.28 However, proponents of the congressional bill sharply criticized and rejected his proposal, calling it a
"political sham that would stall the nation's progress on racial and
'29
sexual equality.
Despite the Presidential veto and the Senate's inability to sustain an override, the advocates of civil rights reform were determined
to amend the laws of employment discrimination. The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 ("H.R. 1") was refiled by House Democrats on January
3, as the first bill of the House of Representatives in the 102nd Congress. 30 Opponents of the legislation regarded this second attempt as
"nearly identical to, and with respect to damages, worse than the bill
which was vetoed by the President."'" On March 12, 1991, as a result of their dissatisfaction, the Administration introduced its own
Civil Rights Act of 1991 (H.R. 1375 and S. 611) as an alternate
proposal in both the House and Senate.3 2 In response to such a
strong opposition, a bipartisan substitute version of H.R. 1, renamed
the Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Employment Act of 1991,
21.

Id.; see infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text (listing the major points of conten-

tion between the congressional majority and the Administration).
22. See 136 CONG. REC. S16,457 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990). See infra notes 137-143 and
accompanying text..
23. Id.; see infra notes 113-136 and accompanying text.
24. Id.; see infra notes 191-210 and accompanying text.
25. Id.; see infra notes 275-297 and accompanying text.
26. Id.
27. See 136 CONG. REC. S16,562 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
28. See 136 CONG. REc. S16,457 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990).
29. Proprietary to the United Press International, Oct. 23, 1990, (Washington News
Section).
30. See H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (text of version 1 of the bill in LEXIS,
Genfed library, Bills file).
31. See H.R. CONF. REP.No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1991) (text of dissenting
views in LEXIS, Legis library, Cmtrpt file).
32. See H.R. 1375, supra note 1, 137 CONG. Rec. at H1662-64; see also S. 611, supra
note 1, 137 CONG. REc. at S3022-23.
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was introduced by House Democrat Brooks and House Republican

Fish on June 4, 1991. 33 It was intended as a compromise in order to
prevent an automatic veto by the President. On June 5, 1991, the
Brooks-Fish substitute passed the House by a vote of 273 to 158, and

it remains the sixth and final version of H.R. 1.1' Although the substitute bill is somewhat similar to the previously vetoed legislation,

several of its provisions have been amended in an attempt to make
the bill more "palatable" to the opposition.

5

Unfortunately, the Ad-

ministration is far from satisfied with its revisions. 36 On September
24, 1991, Senator Jack Danforth introduced the Senate's version of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,3 7 and still the Administration was not
content. Finally, during the third week of October, President Bush
met with Senator Danforth and indicated that he would accept a

compromise bill as long as quotas would not be the inevitable result
of the legislation. 38 During the next several weeks, Senate members

will debate and seek to finalize their bill's provisions while attempting to satiate the House as well as the Administration. Unless a suitable compromise, able to withstand a veto, can be reached by both
House and Senate members, only a Senate override will be able to
keep the legislation alive. Almost two years have elapsed since its

original introduction, and our Government still cannot agree on how
to fairly amend the laws of employment discrimination. Although

our lawmakers acknowledge that civil rights reform is necessary,
33. See H.R. 1, supra note 1, 137 CONG. REC. at H3922-28.
34. Id. at H3958-59.
35. Id. at H3932-3936 (listing the areas in which the bill is amended). For a more
thorough discussion of both the significant provisions in S. 2104 (The Civil Rights Act of
1990) and earlier versions of H.R. 1, see Note, The Defeat of the Civil Rights Act of 1990.
Wading through the rhetoric in Search of a Compromise, 44 VAND. L. REV. 595 (1991);
Comment, Reconstruction, Deconstruction and Legislative Response: The 1989 Supreme
Court Term and the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 475 (1990).
36. See 137 CONG. REC. H3932-36.
37. See S. 1745, supra note 1, (text in LEXIS, Legis library, bills file).
38. Although section 11 of H.R. 1, as proposed by the Brooks-Fish substitute, provides
that nothing in the bill may be construed to "require, encourage, or permit an employer to
adopt hiring or promotion quotas on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin," and
that the use of such quotas "shall be deemed to be an unlawful employment practice" under
Title VII, the opponents of H.R. 1 are convinced that the implementation of quotas remain at
the core of the civil rights bill. See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § I11, 137 CONG. REc. at H3924.
Regardless of the language which forbids the use of quotas, the Administration and other
opponents believe that the cumulative effect of the other provisions in H.R. I, such as those
regarding disparate impact cases and damages, will cause the employer to be left with only the
alternative of "hiring and promoting by the numbers" in order to avoid lengthy and costly
litigation. As a result, opponents of H.R. I believe that employers will be forced into hiring the
minimally qualified person rather than the well, or over-qualified individual. See also 137
CONG. REC. H3944 (daily ed. June 5, 1991).
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they do not share similar beliefs regarding how to achieve "fairness"
in the American workplace. Their differing values and concerns are
illuminated in the numerous versions of, and amendments to, the
proposed legislation. By the time a compromise is reached and a
civil rights act is passed, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 will neither be
solely a reflection of what congressional champion civil rights reformers had intended, nor will it represent only the ideals of President Bush and his Administration.
This Note examines many of the significant provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 as it has been proposed by both the House
and the Administration. Neither bill in its current form is an acceptable alternative to either party. Although compromise and agreement may be reached among Senate, House and Administration
members, it is useful to understand the true intentions, actual goals,
and policy considerations of all parties in order to be able to assess
and appreciate the bill once it is in its final form. Moreover, this
Note will explore how and why reform is necessary, as well as address the similarities, controversial differences, and policy considerations raised by each proposal. Each section of the discussion will include an analysis and commentary of the relevant provisions
proposed by the House and the President, in their respective bills, for
civil rights reform.
Part II discusses the disparate treatment and disparate impact
theories of discrimination. 40 The analysis focuses on the development
of the disparate impact theory, including its controversial interpretation in the landmark case of Griggs v. Duke Power Company,41 to
the startling decision in Wards Cove Packing Company v. Atonio.42
This section addresses such issues as the definition of business necessity,43 the allocation of burdens of proof,44 and the specificity requirements for proving such discrimination.45
Part III analyzes an employer's liability when he or she is motivated by both lawful and unlawful considerations when making business decisions.46 The central issue is whether or not an employer may
avoid a finding of liability, even though a discriminatory motive
played a role in the employment decision, by proving that it would
39.

See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed civil rights laws).

40. See infra notes 56-147 and accompanying text.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

401
490
See
See
See
See

U.S. 424 (1971).
U.S. 642 (1989).
infra notes 84-92, 113-130 and accompanying text.
infra notes 72-83, 108-112 and accompanying text.
infra notes 93-96, 137-143 and accompanying text.
infra notes 150-174 and accompanying text.
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have made the same decision even if it had not taken the illegal criterion into account. This section explores the consequences of the
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins decision 47 in such a mixed-motive
circumstance.
Part IV addresses the importance of consent decrees.48 Many
federal courts have been faced with the question of whether, and
under what circumstances, nonlitigants should be permitted to attack
the consent decree in a subsequent action. This section explores the
systemic dissolution of the impermissible collateral attack doctrine,
and the damaging effects on the strength of consent decrees as a
result of the controversial Martin v. Wilks opinion. 49
Part V examines the statute of limitations period for filing a
Title VII cause of action. 50 The Supreme Court, in Lorance v.
AT&T Technologies, addressed when the limitations period starts to
run in the context of a seniority rule governing layoffs. 51 Does the
statute begin to run from the date that the individual knows, or has
reason to know, that such a system has been adopted, or does the
period commence when the system is applied to the person in question? Both Congress and the Administration assess this triggering
point as well as the length of the period for filing such an action.
Part VI discusses the importance of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 and
outlines the chilling consequences that Patterson v. McLean has had
on the statute's effectiveness in banning intentional race discrimination. 52 In Patterson,the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted section
1981 to apply only in the making, and not in the performance, of
contracts.53 Both Congress and the Administration strongly
believe
54
that there is a compelling need to overturn this decision.
Part VII examines the implications of Title VII's current remedial scheme, as well as explores the advantages and disadvantages of
expanding possible remedies to include compensatory damages, punitive damages, and jury trials. 55 Lastly, Part VIII recognizes that although there is a desperate need for reform, the ability to fairly and
effectively balance the rights of the individual with of those of the
business community will be achieved only through a difficult and del47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

490
See
490
See
490
See
490
See
See

U.S. 228 (1989).
infra notes 175-210
U.S. 755 (1989).
infra notes 211-235
U.S. 900 (1989).
infra notes 236-257
U.S. at 911.
infra notes 219-235
infra notes 258-296

and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF DISPARATE TREATMENT AND
DISPARATE IMPACT

A.

Griggs v. Duke Power Company through Wards Cove
Packing Company v. Atonio

Since the adoption of Title VII more than twenty-five years ago,
57
the statute has been the subject of a myriad of judicial opinions.
Two principle theories of discrimination exist under Title VII: disparate treatment and disparate impact.5 8 Disparate treatment under
Title VII involves treating individuals differently on the basis of their
race, color, sex, national origin, or religion.59 A disparate treatment
case occurs most often when an individual plaintiff attempts to prove
an intentional discriminatory motive of the employer, and the employer asserts a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision.60 In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green61 and
its progeny,6 2 the Supreme Court fashioned a framework for the allocation and burden of proof in disparate treatment cases. First, the
56. See infra at part VIII of accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 453 U.S. 702 (1978); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
58. Title VII does not define discrimination explicitly, but the Supreme Court has developed these two theories of discrimination.
59. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17(1988).
60. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36
n. 15 (1977) (articulating the conceptual theory of a disparate treatment case). The Court
stated that:
[Disparate Treatment] is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment
Id.
61. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Green, a black civil rights activist, protested that his discharge
and the general hiring practices of his employer were racially motivated. Id. at 794. As part of
the protest, Green illegally stalled his car, along with other members of the Congress on Racial
Equality, for the purpose of blocking access to the plant. Id. at 795. In addition, Green engaged in an illegal lock-in, although it was uncertain to the extent that he had participated. Id.
When the employer advertised for replacement personnel, it rejected Green's application on
the ground of his illegal conduct. Id. Green subsequently filed a complaint with the EEOC
charging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 795.
62. See United Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney,
439 U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
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plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. 63
Second, the defendant must "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the employment action.64 And third, the plaintiff
must then prove that the defendant's reason was a mere pretext for
discrimination.15 In 1989, in the controversial decision of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,66 the Supreme Court held that where an
employment decision resulted from a mixture of legitimate and ille-

gitimate motives, this procedural framework is altered and the burden shifts to the employer to prove that it would have made the same

decision even if it had not taken the discriminatory factor into
account.67
Without question, the single most important Title VII decision,

both for the development of the law and its impact on the daily lives
of American workers, is Griggs v. Duke Power Company. 8 In a

unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that Title VII forbids
not only disparate treatment but also practices which, though

adopted without discriminatory intent, have a discriminatory effect
on minorities and women.6 This illegal discriminatory effect is
63. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
64. Id.

65.

Id. at 804.

66. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
67. Id; see infra notes 150-160 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of
mixed-motive discrimination).
68. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, a group of black Duke Power employees claimed
that the company's hiring criteria violated Title VII. The company required applicants for
non-labor jobs to possess a high school diploma and pass two aptitude tests as a condition of
employment in or transfer to jobs at the plant.Id. "Neither was directed or intended to measure the ability to learn or perform a particular job or category of jobs." Id. at 427-28. These
facially neutral criteria disproportionately excluded blacks from the higher paying jobs.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28. For a thorough discussion of the development of the impact theory, see Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972).
69. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. The selection devices may be objective, subjective or a
combination of both. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co., v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)
(employer hired those individuals who he felt were "best for the job."); Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 484 U.S. 918 (1988) (subjective judgment of supervisors of candidates for
promotion); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (drug history);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight requirements); Walls v. Mississippi Dep't of Public Welfare, 730 F.2d 306, 316-17 (5th Cir. 1984) (educational requirements); Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 726 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1984) (experience requirements); Keenan v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 707 F.2d 1274 (11 th Cir. 1984) (credit,
garnishment and bankruptcy records); Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183 (5th
Cir. 1983) (employment tests); Avant v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 716 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir.
1983) (arrest and conviction records); Berkman v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 177
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), af-'d, 705 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1983) (physical requirements); Carroll v.
Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929
(1980) (dress requirements).
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known as disparate or adverse impact. Title VII, the Court ruled,
"proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. ' 70 One year later, in
1972, Congress explicitly ratified the Supreme Court's affirmation
that Congress enacted Title VII to prohibit all forms of employment
discrimination, not simply those which are intentionally
discriminatory. 1
Under Griggs and its progeny, analysis of a disparate impact
case proceeds in three distinct stages. 2 First, the complaining party
is required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that the employment practice at issue "selects applicants for hire
or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of
the pool of applicants. '73 The complaining party has to demonstrate
that the practice has an adverse impact on qualified applicants, unless the application process itself is flawed by discrimination, in
which case disparate impact on qualified potential applicants is sufficient. 74 Second, once the complaining party proves that the challenged employment practices excludes a number of qualified women
or minorities, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the
practice is required by business necessity.7 5 Third, even if the employer satisfies the burden, "it remains open to the complaining
party to show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest.'' 78 For eighteen years, the Griggs decision has had a
remarkable impact on the American workplace. In hundreds of
cases, federal courts have struck down discriminatory barriers to the
participation of minorities and women in the workplace, and employers have voluntarily eliminated discriminatory practices in countless
77
other instances.
In 1989, a five-justice majority of the Supreme Court drastically cut back on the scope and effectiveness of the Griggs decision
70. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
71. See Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codifying the Supreme Court interpretation of Title VII).
72. These stages are set out in detail in the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
73. Id. at 425.
74. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 306-08 (1977).
75. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32. See infra notes 84-92, 113-130 and accompanying
text (discussing the standard of business necessity).
76. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425.
77. See S. RaP. No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1990) (citing United States Bureau
of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1984, Table 696 (1983)).
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in Wards Cove Packing Company v. Atonio.78 The Wards Cove majority formulated a new burden and standard of proof to analyze the
employer's response after a prima facie case is established. 79 The
Court held that after a showing of adverse impact, the employer only
has the burden of "producing evidence of a business justification for
his employment practice. The burden of persuasion, however, remains at all times with the disparate impact plaintiff."' 0 Thus, the
employer must only sustain the burden of production. 8 ' Without
question, the Supreme Court's 1989 Term reversed the Griggs allocation of proof which had been followed for almost two decades. It is
clear that the Wards Cove allocation creates an unduly burdensome
and inefficient hurdle for the plaintiff to overcome. In most instances
the evidence regarding the existence of an adequate justification for
an exclusionary practice is in the possession of the employer, the
party who adopted the practice. 82 The employer is far more familiar
with its own operations and the proper requirements needed for the
job at issue; the employer has control over the employment process;
it selects the practices used to make an employment decision; and it
is more likely to be aware of the relative cost and benefits of the
practices used and of alternative practices that were not used to
make the decision. 3
In Griggs, the Supreme Court devised a standard that the employer must satisfy in order to justify the use of a practice that, although is fair in form, has an adverse impact on women and minorities in operation.84 The Supreme Court held that in order to sustain
a justification, "[tihe touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown
to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited."85 Chief
Justice Burger not only used the exact phrase "business necessity,"
78. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). A class of non-white cannery workers brought a Title VII
action against their employer, Wards Cove Packing Co. Id. at 647. The cannery consisted of
two general types of employment: cannery jobs on the cannery line and noncannery jobs which
fell into a variety of classifications. Id. The jobs on the cannery line were unskilled positions
unlike the noncannery jobs. As a result, the cannery line jobs were filled mostly by non-whites.
Id. The respondents alleged that a variety of improper hiring and promotion practices were
responsible for the skewed stratification of the work force and therefore the company had
denied them jobs on the basis of race. Id. at 647-48.

79.

Id.

80.

Id. at 659.

81.

Id.

82.

See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 29-30 (1991).

83. Id.
84.
85.

Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
Id. (emphasis added).
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he also utilized such terms as "related to job performance," 8 "manifest relationship to the employment in question," 87 and "demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance" 88 as interchangeable
phrases in the text of the opinion. In Wards Cove, the majority set
out a considerably more lenient standard, and in effect, repealed that
which was articulated in the Griggs decision. 89 The Wards Cove ruling stripped an employee of the safeguards provided by the standard
that had been repeatedly followed for approximately two decades in
the American workplace. The Court in Wards Cove stated that,
"there is no requirement that the challenged practice be essential or
indispensable to the employer's business for it to pass muster."90
While under Griggs, the touchstone was business necessity, under
Wards Cove "[t]he touchstone . . . is a reasoned view of the em-

ployer's justification" 91 to determine "whether a challenged practice
serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the
employer. '92 The weak standard adopted by the Wards Cove bare
majority severely undermines the effectiveness of Griggs and Title
VII.
Moreover, employment decisions are often times based on a
multiple criteria of employment practices. Where a combination of
more than one employment practice is used, and the resulting employment decision clearly has a disparate impact on qualified women
or minorities, a complaining party may be unable to isolate which
factor or factors is responsible for the disparate impact. Furthermore, in some instances adequate information may be available as to
the effect of each practice, but it may be that a group of factors
combine to produce the significant disparity without any one factor
being responsible for the adverse impact. Before Wards Cove, the
Supreme Court had indicated in Griggs that there was no requirement for a complaining party to isolate and identify the specific employment practices or the extent to which they might have contributed to an employment decision with a proven discriminatory
effect. 3 In addition, several federal circuit courts have held that a
plaintiff can prove disparate impact by demonstrating that the cu86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id. at 432
Id. at 436.
See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 642.
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id.

93. The court frequently referred to "practices" and "procedures," rather than identifying the specific employment practice at issue. Id. at 430-33.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol9/iss1/4

12

1991]

Lilling: The CivilCompromise
Rights Actof
ofCivil
1991:
An Examination of the Storm Precedi
Rights

mulative effect of a multi-factor employment decision is discrimina-

tory without identifying which factor was responsible for the decision.8 4 In Wards Cove, however, the Court disregarded prior
precedents. Instead, the Court held that a plaintiff has the absolute
obligation to isolate which facet of a multi-factor employment deci-

sion is responsible for the disparate impact, 95 and then he or she
must demonstrate the severity of the impact, even when the employer failed to collect or retain the very data that would be needed

to identify the specific factor or factors which are responsible for the
disparate impact in the first place. 96
B.

The Response of Congress, the Administration, and the Legal
Community

Both H.R. 1 and H.R. 1375 codify various forms of disparate
impact analysis under Title VII and reverse, to differing degrees, the

decision of Wards Cove. 97 However, the relevant provisions in each
bill have few similarities. Prior to the introduction of the bipartisan
substitute bill on June 5, 1991, the opponents of H.R. 1 enumerated

several "imperfections" in the proposed legislation.98 These were the
same objections which were first raised when S. 2104 was first
drafted. First, there was sharp dissatisfaction with the proposed legal
standard of "business necessity." 9 Second, opponents were unwilling
94. See, e.g., Powers v. Alabama Dep't of Education, 854 F.2d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir.
1988); Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511, 1520-25 (3d Cir. 1988); Griffen v. Carline, 755
F.2d 1516,1523 (11th Cir. 1985).
95. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656.
96. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,at 42 (1991).
97. See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 102, 137 CONG. REC. at H3923; see also H.R. 1375,
supra note I,§ 4, 137 CONG. REc. at H1663.
98. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 126 (1991). See infra notes
99-103 and accompanying text.
99. Id. The definition of business necessity has undergone considerable reform since the
Civil Rights Act of 1990 was first introduced by members of the House and Senate. As originally drafted, the legislation defined business necessity to mean "essential to effective job performance." S. REP. No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1990). Although this standard was
intended to restore the definition of business necessity as articulated in Griggs and its progeny
prior to the Wards Cove ruling, opponents of the bill saw this as an attempt to supersede
rather than codify the standard in Griggs. The Committee received testimony expressing concern that the term "essential" was overly rigid and would therefore lead to the imposition of
quotas. Id. As a result the Committee agreed to drop the word "essential" from the definition
and amended it to mean that "the challenged practice or group of practices must bear a substantial and demonstrable relationship to effective job performance." H.R. REP. No. 644,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 53 (1990).
By the time the Civil Rights Act of 1990 was vetoed by President Bush, the definition of
business necessity was codified by a two-prong approach. S. 2104, supra note 1, §
3(o)(l)(A),(B), 136 CONG. REc. at H9552. In the case of employment practices covered by
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to accept the plaintiff's ability to "group" an endless number of employment practices under a claim of disparate impact without having
the first prong, business necessity meant that the practice or group of practices must bear a
significant relationship to successful performance of the job. Id. at § 3(o)(1)(A). The first
prong applied to all employment practices "involving selection." Id. Examples included, hiring, assignment, transfer, and promotion. Id. In determining whether this showing has been
made by the employer, demonstrable evidence was required; unsubstantiated opinion and hearsay were not sufficient. Id. at § 3(o)(2). "The court may receive such evidence as statistical
reports, validation studies, expert testimony, performance evaluations, written records or notes
related to the practice or decision, prior successful experience and other evidence as permitted
by the Federal Rules of Evidence ..
" Id. The underlying practical question is whether use
of the practice in dispute is significantly more likely to produce an effective work force than
other, less discriminatory alternatives. Id.
The second prong of the business necessity defense was no less stringent a standard than
that encompassed by the first prong and the evidentiary burdens were the same. Id. at §
3(o)(l)(B). It applied only in a limited category of cases where job performance was simply
irrelevant. Examples included, plant closings, relocations, and rules relating to alcohol or tobacco use. Id. In those cases the employer could demonstrate business necessity by showing
that the challenged practice bore a significant relationship to a significant business objective of
the employer. Id. In this regard, the objective must have been a business objective and not a
social, moral, political, religious, or other objective. Id.
The initial versions of H.R 1, including the definition of business necessity, were substantially similar to S. 2104. For a detailed discussion of the definition in the initial drafts of H.R.
I, see Note,The Defeat of the Civil Rights Act of 1990: Wading through the rhetoric in
Search of a Compromise, 44 VAND. L. REV. 595 (1991).
Staunch supporters of the Administration's bill were adamantly opposed to the twopronged definition of business necessity. The approach of trying to categorize practices into
one box called selection and the other non-selection was deemed unprecedented and thought to
be a catalyst for years of litigation as courts attempt to sort out which defense should apply in
any given fact situation. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. i, at 132 (1991).
Furthermore, opponents declared that no decision had ever required that an employment practice be justified through a showing of a "substantial and demonstrable relationship to effective
job performance." Id. at 133. "A demonstrable evidence requirement seems to command that
a federal court accept only a portion of the evidence that may be relevant to the issue before
it .... "Id.
This new standard, according to the Administration, was not a codification of any of the
various formulations articulated in the Griggs decision. Id. at 132. Opponents believed that the
bill restrictively eliminated any possible defense of selection procedures that did not hinge on
successful job performance yet were reflective of quite legitimate policies. Id. Opponents stated
that "the definition of business necessity . . . is unnecessarily narrow, would have a negative
impact on job-selection and test-validation procedures, and would eliminate numerous practices that evolved over the years." Id. at 133(quoting testimony on behalf of the American
Psychological Association (APA) from the hearing on H.R. I which was held on March 5,
1991).
The bill compounds these problems immeasurably by requiring that employers prove
this novel definition of business necessity with demonstrable evidence. [I]t makes
very difficult to defend subjective criteria such as ambition, leadership abilities, good
judgment, or the ability to work well with others. Seeking the best possible candidate for the job would become risky business, since that would no longer be a defense in a discrimination lawsuit. The search for excellence would be both illegitimate and illegal. .

..
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to identify the specific employment practice at issue or prove causation.1"' And third, the Administration and congressional opponents
strongly criticized the bill's remedial scheme. 1' 0 Although a cap was
placed on punitive damages, compensatory damages remained unlimited.10 2 In essence, opponents of the bill feared that quotas would
be the natural result of many of the provisions in the legislation,
because employers would hire by "the numbers" in order to protect
themselves against lengthy, complicated, and expensive lawsuits. As
a result, the bipartisan substitute
seeks to address these concerns in
03
order to temper the opposition.
H.R. 1 and the alternative proposed by the Bush Administration
intend the term "disparate impact" to retain the meaning it has been
given by the courts in the line of cases extending from Griggs up to
the decision in Wards Cove, and would therefore remain unchanged
by the legislation. 04 H.R. 1, unlike H.R. 1375, further specifies that
"[t]he mere existence of a statistical imbalance in an employer's
workforce on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
is not alone sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact violation.' 0 5 The complaining party may use statistics to
make a prima facie case of disparate impact, but they must show
that the challenged employment practice or group of practices results in the disparate impact. 10 6 Proponents of H.R. 1375 regard this
provision as irrelevant since it merely codifies the existing rule that
"the proper comparison [is] between the racial composition of [the
at-issue jobs] and the racial composition
of the qualified population
07
in the relevant labor market.'
There is little dispute among our lawmakers regarding who
should bear the burden of proof in disparate impact cases. Both H.R.
100. See H.R. REP. No. 644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 60 (1990).
101.
102.

See S. REP. No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 95-97 (1990).
Punitive damages could not exceed $150,000, unless the amount of compensatory

damages awarded were greater than this maximum amount. In such an instance, the amount
of punitive damages that could be awarded could be equal to the sum of compensatory dam-

ages and equitable monetary relief. Therefore, in practice, the $150,000 cap was considered to
be a legal fiction if the awarded compensatory damages were greater. See S. 2104, supra note

1, § 8, 136
103.
104.

CONG.

REC. at H9554.

See 137 CONG. REC. H3934-36 (daily ed. June 5, 1991).
See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 102, 137 CONG. REc. at H3923; see also H.R. 1375,

supra note 1, § 4, 137
105.

CONG.

REC. at H1663.

H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 101(c)(4), 137

CONG.

REC. at H3923. A plaintiff cannot

establish a prima facie case of disparate impact merely by showing that an employer had a
smaller proportion of minority or women employees than existed in the population as a whole.
H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 32 (1991).
106. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 33 (1991).
107. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977).
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1 and H.R. 1375 disagree with the Wards Cove decision which
stated that the burden of persuasion remains with the disparate-impact plaintiff.108 Both versions of the bill restore to the employer the
burden of persuasion to justify employment practices which have a
discriminatory impact. 109 The proof of business necessity is intended
to be an affirmative defense as to which the employer bears the burden of persuasion. 110 There are several reasons for placing the burden on the employer. First, the employer has control over the practices used in making employment decisions, and it has selected the
practice or practices involved. 1 Second, the employer should 112
be
aware of the relative benefits of the practice(s) selected for use.
And third, the employer should be aware of the alternative procedures and standards that are available, but not chosen. Thus, the
employer is the party who is better able to efficiently satisfy the burden of proof.
Both H.R. 1 and H.R. 1375 seek to codify a fair yet practical
definition of business necessity. 1 However, there is sharp disagreement over the language which should be used to capture the standard for justifying the use of procedures which have a discriminatory
impact on the grounds of race, sex, or national origin. 4 The Wards
Cove decision placed a nearly impossible burden on plaintiffs in cases
involving nonintentional discrimination.11 5 H.R. 1 is intended to restore the original standards of the unanimous Griggs decision while
providing flexibility to employers in hiring qualified workers. 116 Since
the original version of the congressional legislation, the language defining business necessity has undergone considerable reform in order
to satisfy many of the concerns of the Administration while main108.

See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Wards Cove stan-

dard for the burden of proof in disparate impact cases).
109. See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 102(1)(A), 137 CONG. Rac. at H3923; see also H.R.
1375, supra note 1, § 4, 137 CONG. REC. at H1663.
110. Id.
111. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 29-30 (1991).
112. Id.
113. See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 101(o)(1),(2) 137 CONG. REc. at H3923; see also
H.R. 1375, supra note 1, § 2(n), 137 CONG. REc. at H1663.
114. See infra notes 119-136 and accompanying text (discussing the conflicting formulations of the definition of business necessity).
115. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (holding that the employer only has
the burden of "producing evidence of a business justification for his employment practice. The
burden of persuasion however, remains at all times with the disparate impact plaintiff."). 490
U.S. at 659.
116. See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 101(o)(1),(2), S, 137 CONG. REC. at H3923, 3950; see
infra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
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taining the spirit of the Griggs decision."i 7 H.R. 1 currently provides
for a single standard to be applied to all employment practices in
disparate impact claims, rather than one standard for selection practices and another standard for nonselection practices as outlined in
the original bill. 118 The term "required by business necessity" is defined by H.R. 1 to mean that "a practice or a group of practices
must bear a significant and manifest relationship to the requirements
for effective job performance." ' 9 The requirements for effective job
performance include such factors as attendance, punctuality, and not
engaging in misconduct or insubordination. 20 In addition, a provision has been carved out to bar the employment of any individual
who "currently and knowingly uses or possesses an illegal
drug ....,,121 As long as the rule is not adopted with an intent to
discriminate, the employer may consider such behavior to be an unlawful employment practice and therefore such an individual need
not be hired. 22 These additional considerations which go beyond the
actual work task allow the business community to take in to account
other relevant factors so long as they are related to the actual employment in question.' 2 Employment requirements that are a reflection of an employer's biased objectives or preferences are not and
should not be acceptable criteria.
H.R. 1375, on the other hand, provides that a practice which
has a disparate impact can be successfully defended on the grounds
of business necessity if the employer proves that such practice "has a
manifest relationship to the employment in question or that the respondent's legitimate employment goals are significantly served by,
even if they do not require, the challenged practice.'1 24 This is a
considerably more lenient standard than that proposed in both H.R.
1. and the Griggs decision. 25 The definition proposed in H.R. 1375
is a codification of the Wards Cove standard. 126 The Administration
believes that the legal standard proposed by H.R. 1 is too difficult
for companies to meet, and therefore this standard will compel com117. See supra discussion in note 99.
118.

See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 101(o)(1),(2) 137

119.

Id; see supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text in order to make a comparison

CONG.

Rac. at H3923.

between the definition of business necessity in H.R. 1 and the standards that Chief Justice
Burger used in the Griggs opinion.
120. See H.R. 1, supra note I,§ 101 , 137 CoNG. REc. at H3923.

121.

Id. at § 101(C)(3).

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
See 137 Cong. Rec. H3950 (daily ed. June 5, 1991).
H.R. 1375, supra note 1, § 2(n), 137 CONG. REc. at H1663 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 85-88, 118-123 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
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panies to adopt quotas in order to avoid the possibility of long and
expensive litigation.1 27 The proponents of H.R. 1375 have offered
several reasons why their standard of business necessity is the proper
one for codification. The Administration argues that "[t]he 'manifest
relationship test' was first announced in the Griggs decision and has
been used in virtually every Supreme Court decision concerning disparate impact decided after Griggs. The 'significantly serves test' is
also nothing new and is simply an outgrowth of the Griggs manifest
relationship test." 12 8 Supporters of H.R. 1375 further buttress their
position by referring to the language of the Griggs opinion which
states that, "Congress directed the thrust of [Title VII] to the conse-

quences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.

129

127. See 137 Cong. Rec. H3933 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (opponents of H.R. I analyze
the changes in its provisions since the bill was initially introduced in January).
128. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 130-31 (1991). There is substantial authority that the 'manifest relationship to the employment in question' standard has been
used numerous times since the Griggs decision. See e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321 (1977); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); see also 137 Cong. Rec. S12375 (daily
ed. Aug. 2, 1991) (recent study prepared for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund by Fried,
Frank, Harris, Shriver, & Jacobson clearly proves that prior to Wards Cove almost all disparate impact cases used a test similar to that of job performance and manifest relationship to
the employment in question).
However, the Administration is supports their position by claiming that the "significantly
serves test" is an outgrowth of the Griggs standard. Clearly, the Griggs standard was intended
to ensure that practices which have a discriminatory impact are justifiable only if they are
related to the performance of the job. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. Although
the Administration prefers the language of "manifest relationship to the employment in question"; in practice these phrases have had an analogous meaning in almost all cases since
Griggs. See infra notes 131-136. The Administration supports the notion that an employment
practice may be justified if it significantly serves a legitimate employment goal of the employer
even if it does not require the practice, by citing to only three cases, including Wards Cove.
The other two cases, Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 440 U.S. 569 (1979) and Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 484 U.S. 918 (1988) articulated this lenient standard approximately nine years apart from each other. In Beazer, the Court considered the legitimate
goals of safety and efficiency. 440 U.S. at 569. The Court permitted the exclusion of methadone users, who had been in drug treatment programs for more than one year, from employment with the New York City Transit Authority. Id. Even with respect to non-safety-sensitive
jobs the practice was deemed to be justified because the employer's legitimate goals were "significantly served by" the rule at issue even though the rule was not required by those goals.
440 U.S. at 587 n. 31. Nine years later in Watson, the Court permitted an employer to justify
his subjective opinions and goals, regarding the denial of a promotion, by the business necessity standard as it was articulated in Beazer, 484 U.S. at 918. The Administration should not
equate the standard in Griggs and its progeny with the standards in Wards Cove, Watson, and
Beazer, clearly they are different. Although the Supreme Court may have sporadically strayed
from the intent of the Griggs decision, that should not automatically mean that the Wards
Cove standard of business necessity deserves to be codified.
129. H.R. REP. No. 644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at 115 (1990) (quoting Griggs,
401 U.S. at 432).
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Therefore, an employer may be seeking to attain legitimate goals,
such as safety and efficiency, although the motivation for requiring
the practice is not significantly related to an employee's performance
of the job.130
In response to the Administration's position, a recent study decisively refutes President Bush's claim that job performance is not the
proper standard for codification.131 It reveals that in almost all disparate impact cases from 1971 to 1989, employers were permitted to
justify practices that had a discriminatory impact only when they
demonstrated that such practices were significantly related to the
ability to perform the job.132 The study concluded that in only 8 out
of 225 cases did the court apply a standard other than job performance.133 In other words, the job performance standard was applied
96 % of the time. The exact phrase "job performance" was utilized
34 times beginning with the Griggs opinion, and in 15 other instances the court used phrases which were clearly equivalent.134 Furthermore, under the job performance standard, employers won 28 %
of the time even where the challenged practice resulted in a significant discriminatory impact on women or minorities. a8 Therefore, the
notion that the job performance standard is too high for employers
to meet, and would therefore result in the adoption of quotas, is misguided. Lastly, in numerous other cases, the employer prevailed because the complaining parties were unable to make the required
showing of a discriminatory impact.1 38
When a group of employment practices is challenged, instead of
lumping them together as originally provided for in H.R. 1,137 the
plaintiff must identify each discriminatory practice unless the court
finds that the plaintiff, after diligent effort, is unable to do so from
the employer's records or from other information of the employer
reasonably available through discovery. 38 And if a group of employment practices is challenged, H.R. 1 provides that the employer need
130. See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 569.
131. See 137 CONG. REC. S12375 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991) (recent study prepared for
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund by Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver, & Jacobson clearly proves
that prior to Wards Cove almost all disparate impact cases used a test of job performance).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. See also Note, The Defeat of the Civil
Rights Act of 1990: Wading through the rhetoric in Search of a Compromise, 44 VAND. L.
REv. 595, 602-03 (1991).
138. See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 102(1)(B), 137 CONG. Rac. at H3923.
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only defend against those practices which contribute in a meaningful
way to the disparity. 139 H.R. 1 reaffirms that an employer may rely
upon relative qualifications or skills in making employment decisions,
so long as the reliance is required by business necessity and therefore
related to performance of the job.
H.R. 1375, on the other hand, does not allow for the grouping
of practices in the assertion of a disparate impact claim, even if the
plaintiff then identifies each practice in the cluster.140 Rather, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that a particular employment practice is
responsible for the disparate impact and then the burden is shifted to
the defendant to show that the practice was required by business
necessity.1 41 Proponents of H.R. 1375 argue that the overwhelming
weight of past case law indicates that the Administration's bill is the
correct formulation of this principle.142 "The Supreme Court cases
on disparate impact have, as a factual matter, involved particular
of appeals long ago
practices, and the vast majority of circuit courts
43
expressly imposed this burden on plaintiffs.'1
Finally, with respect to disparate impact analysis, H.R. 1 provides that if a defendant demonstrates that a practice or group of
practices is in fact required by business necessity, a complaining
party can still prevail by showing that another employment practice
is available that has less of a disparate impact and would serve the
respondent as well.' 4 4 However, the difference in impact between the
two practices must be more than merely negligible. 45 H.R. 1375,
facially similar to H.R. 1, provides that a defendant can be held
liable if the plaintiff demonstrates the existence of an alternative
practice. However, "the alternative employment practice must be
comparable in cost and equally effective in predicting job performance or achieving the respondent's legitimate employment goals...
and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative.' 4 6 Opponents
of H.R. 1 argue that the congressional bill establishes an entirely
new principle under which an employer would be per se liable even if
he or she did not know or could not have known about the alternative practice.' 47 Supporters of the Administration's position argue
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at § 102(C).
See H.R. 1375, supra note 1, § 4, 137 CoNG. REc. at H1663.
Id.
See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 134 (1991).
Id.
See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 102(1)(A), 137 CONG. REC. at H3923.
Id.
See H.R. 1375, supra note 1, § 4, 137 CONG. REc. at H1663 (emphasis added).
See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 137 (1991).
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that "[a]n employer, to be protected from liability [under H.R. 1],
would have to search the universe before implementing each and
every practice

. . .

to determine whether some other method would

accomplish the same purpose with less impact." 14 8 Under the Administration's bill, an employer is liable only if he or she intentionally and knowingly refuses to adopt1 49an equally effective practice
which has less of a disparate impact.
III.

NONDISCRIMINATORY AND DISCRIMINATORY FACTORS IN A
SINGLE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE, POLICY, OR DECISION

A.

The Harsh Effects of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins

The effectiveness of Title VII's ban on discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin has been severely
undercut by the recent Supreme Court decision of Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins. 50 In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins sued her employer, an accounting firm, alleging that she was unlawfully denied a
promotion because of her sex.'
She had worked at Price
Waterhouse for five years when she was proposed for a partnership. "52
' At that time, out of 662 partners, only 7 were women. 5 3
Hopkins was the only woman out of 88 persons proposed for partnership that year.' Hopkins was denied the promotion despite the fact
that she had brought the firm more business than any of the 87 men
being considered for partnership at the time. 55 She was told by one
partner that her professional problems would be solved if she would
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."'1 56 However,
at the trial level, the court found that both her supporters and opponents indicated that she was "sometimes overly aggressive, unduly
harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with staff."' 5
148.

Id. at 137-38.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 137.
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Id. at 232.
Id. at 233.
Id.
Id. Forty-seven of these candidates were admitted to the partnership, 21 were re-

jected, and 20, including Hopkins, were held for reconsideration the following year.
155. Id. "In a jointly prepared statement supporting her candidacy, the partners in Hop-

kins' office showcased her successful 2 year effort to secure a $25 million contract with the
Department of State, labeling it 'an outstanding performance' and one that Hopkins carried
out virtually at the partner level." Id. at 233.

156. Id. at 235.
157.

618 F. Supp. 1109, 1113.
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Where an employer is motivated by both lawful and unlawful
considerations, the question becomes how large a part the discriminatory factor must play in the employment action before a court
holds that the decision was made as a result of the illegal criterion.
A number of appellate courts have taken the same view as the Department of Justice, which argued that Title VII was violated whenever a discriminatory motive played a part in an employment decision. 158 Proof that an employer would have made the same decision
for nondiscriminatory reasons, the Justice Department argued, did
not erase the violation, but merely limited the appropriate remedy.159
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse completely disregarded the reasoning of the appellate courts or the Justice Department. The plurality opinion by Justice Brennan stated that "[when]
a plaintiff. . . shows that [her] gender played a motivating part in
an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it
had not [taken the plaintiff's gender into account]. '"1 6 The Court's
holding in Price Waterhouse strips a complaining party's protections
against intentional employment discrimination by allowing such discrimination to escape sanction completely under Title VII. The effect
of this decision is that a court is rendered powerless to end discriminatory abuse when a particular plaintiff brings a case and would
have suffered the disputed employment action for some alternative,
legitimate reason.
B.

Response of Congress and the Lack Thereof by the
Administration

H.R. 1 amends Title VII to overrule this aspect of the Price
158. See e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985); King v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1984); Ostroff v. Employment Exchange Inc., 683 F.2d
302 (9th Cir. 1982); Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F. 2d 302 (9th Cir. 1981); Roberts v. Fri, 20
F.E.P. Cases 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
159. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 23-4, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)(citations omitted). In its brief to the Supreme Court, the Justice Department explained that:
it is proper to place the burden on the defendant to prove that a given employment
decision would have been the same in a discrimination free environment. If the defendant makes such a showing, the plaintiff is made whole by an award of attorney's
fees and an injunction against future discrimination. In effect, the defendant is ordered to cease discriminatory activity, which enhances the plaintiff's employment
opportunities in the future. But the defendant need not hire, reinstate, promote, or
provide backpay to plaintiff.

Id.
160.

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45.
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Waterhouse decision. 161 This legislation provides that proof that an
employer would have made the same employment decision in the absence of discriminatory reasons is relevant to determine not the liability for discriminatory employment practices, but only the appropriate remedy. 16 2 H.R. 1 states that "an unlawful employment
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor
for such employment practice, even though other factors also contributed to such practice.' 6 ,3 This standard would not make mere
discriminatory thoughts actionable.16 4 Rather, to establish liability,
the complaining party must demonstrate that the discrimination was
an active, motivating factor in the
employment decision rather than
65
a passive, inoperative thought.1
H.R. 1 clarifies that where a plaintiff proves that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for an employment practice, and an employer demonstrates that the same action would have been taken in the absence of the discriminatory motive, a court may not order the employer to hire, reinstate, promote
or provide back pay to the complainant.1 66 This provision is consistent with the current text of Title VII, which provides that "no order
of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual. . . if such individual. . . was refused. . . employment...
for any reason other than [the] discrimination. . . .,e If the pres-

ence of a motivating discriminatory factor is established in violation
of Title VII alongside a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, liability
will be established. 6 " However, the relief that may be awarded includes injunctive or declaratory relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.'6 9 In response to concerns that
damages might be awarded for injuries that are not directly attributable to the discrimination, H.R. 1 explicitly provides that "damages
for a violation of may be awarded only for injury attributable to the
unlawful employment practice.' 17 0
161.
162.
163.
42 U.S.C.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See H.R. 1, supra note 1,§ 103(a)(1), 137 CONG. Rac. at H3923.
Id. at § 103(b).
H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 103(a)(1), 137 CONG. REC. at H3923. This section amends
§ 2000e-2 (1988) (emphasis added).
See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 48 (1991).
Id.
Id. at § 103(b).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 103(a)(1), 137 CoNG. REc. at H3923.

169. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 49 (1991).
170.

H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 103(b), 137 CONG. Rac. at H3923.
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H.R. 1375 does not address the Price Waterhouse decision. Proponents of this alternate bill believe that H.R 1 will foreclose an
employer's ability to rebut or refute the inference of discrimination
by showing that the factor was not relevant because of the predominant weight of the legitimate factors."" Opponents of H.R. 1 are
particularly concerned that, "if a jury found that the violation had
caused

. . .

mental anguish or distress, it could award compensatory

and punitive damages, even though in fact the employee was being
treated no differently than they would have been treated in the absence of any discrimination. 17 2 Furthermore, supporters of H.R.
1375 have indicated that Price Waterhouse has actually turned out
to be a very favorable decision for plaintiffs. 77 Fifteen of the
nineteen reported lower court decisions since Price Waterhouse have
resulted in victories for the complaining party. 74 Therefore, reversal
of Price Waterhouse, according to the Administration, is not
necessary.
IV.

CHALLENGES

To CONSENT JUDGMENTS OR ORDERS

Martin v. Wilks: Stripping the Protections Provided by the
Impermissible CollateralAttack Doctrine

A.

Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, consent
decrees have been utilized to foster resolution in a countless number
of employment discrimination cases.17 5 These decrees often have had
an adverse impact on the interests of persons other than the original
litigants.' 76 However, the courts have had to balance the competing
and equally compelling interests of affording an individual his or her
171. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1991) (text of dissenting views in LEXIS, Legis library, Cmtrpt file).
172.

Id. Opponents of H.R. 1 view the bill as an attempt to transform Title VII from

an employment discrimination statute into a tort statute.
173. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 157-58 (1991). Ann Hopkins, the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, won a backpay award of almost $400,000, attorneys'
fees, and a full partnership in her accounting firm.
174.

Id. (referring to a Justice Department study that indicated Price Waterhouse was

in practice a favorable precedent for plaintiffs).
175. See, e.g., Striff v. Mason, 849 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1988); Devereaux v. Geary, 765
F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1985); Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982); Dennison
v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981).
A consent decree is a hybrid between a private contract or settlement between parties and

a judgment rendered by a court. The parties agree to the terms of a consent decree, and the
court agrees to enforce it as a judgment. Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third
Parties, 87 MICH. L. REv. 321, 324-25 (1988).

176. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
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own day in court and bringing finality to litigation. 7 ' Many federal
courts have been faced with the question of whether, and under what
circumstances, nonlitigants should be permitted rather than pre-

cluded from attacking the consent decree in a subsequent action.178
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Martin v. Wilks, 7 9 a

majority of the federal courts had eagerly supported the impermissible collateral attack doctrine and implemented restrictive rules pre-

cluding all challenges to a Title VII consent decree once it had been
entered by a court. 80 Barring challenges to consent decrees is advantageous for several reasons. First, if the decrees are subject to per-

petual challenge, their effectiveness is severely undermined and judicial resources are wasted by the relitigation of settled claims. 8 '
177. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 50 (1991). "Indeed, the
principle of a day in court is meaningless without a second, equally important principle-that
of finality of judgments." Id.
178. Id.
179. 490 U.S. 755 (1989). In Wilks, seven white firefighters in Birmingham, Alabama
filed a complaint for injunctive relief. They claimed that a consent decree illegally discriminated against them since they were denied promotions in favor of less qualified black candidates as a result of the city's compliance with the decree. Id. at 758. The district court, 28
FEP Cases 1834 (N.D. Ala. 1981), denied relief, finding that the white plaintiffs knew at an
early stage of the proceedings that their rights could be adversely affected. Id. The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed both the denial of intervention and the denial of injunctive relief. United
States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1519-20 (11 th Cir. 1983). In doing so, the Eleventh
Circuit indicated that the firefighters could file a separate Title VII suit to challenge specific
violations of their rights. Id. at 1518. Soon after, several other groups of white firefighters and
other city employees brought lawsuits, claiming that they were being denied promotions pursuant to the decree because of their race. See 490 U.S. at 760. After trial on some of those
claims, the district court dismissed those claims on two grounds. Id. First, the court ruled that
since the decrees were lawful and the promotions were required by the decrees, there was no
illegal discrimination against the white firefighters. Id. Second, the court ruled that the decrees
were not susceptible to collateral attack by persons who were aware of the earlier litigation
who failed to intervene in a timely fashion. Id. On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, allowing the collateral attack. In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment
Litigation, 833 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's ruling. 490 U.S. at 761.
180. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762-3 n. 3.
181. See H.R. RaP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 51-3 (1991). Wilks does not
only subject future decrees to perpetual challenge; existing decrees are equally endangered.
The absurdity of the Wilks rule in this respect is demonstrated by Birmingham Mayor Richard Arrington, Jr. in his testimony before the Committee regarding that city's litigation, which
began in 1974:
We face yet another trial sometime this year on the validity of a consent decree, the
validity of which was confirmed in 1981 and again in 1985. In that trial, we will be
defending the decree against the same parties who challenged it in 1981 and 1985,
and who are making the identical arguments they made in 1981 and in 1985. ...
[A] third successful defense of the decree, even if affirmed on appeal, will not likely
end this taxpayer financial debacle.
Id. at 54 n. 47 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1990. Hearings on H.R. 4000 Before the House
Comm. on Education and Labor and the House JudiciarySubcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
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Second, the impermissible collateral attack doctrine encourages voluntary settlement of employment discrimination litigation.1,82 Third,
by allowing repetitive challenges of a consent decree, every potentially interested person has to be joined as an additional party, no
matter how remote his or her interest might be, in order to achieve
any measure of finality in the resolution of an employment discrimination suit.183 This would be extremely expensive, impractical and a
waste of judicial resources. 84 Fifth and finally, the impermissible
collateral attack doctrine protects a defendant from conflicting judgments by preventing the possibility of inconsistent obligations and
the threat of contempt findings from two separate courts.18 5

The Supreme Court, in Martin v. Wilks, rejected the rule as
well as the reasoning followed by the circuit courts.18 6 Although the
Court recognized that a large number of the Federal Courts of Appeals barred persons from filing an untimely lawsuit that challenged
a consent decree,1 87 the Court rejected the restrictive rule barring
collateral attacks and adopted an opposite and expansive rule. 18 The
Court held that nothing in Title VII or the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure bars a person who has failed to intervene in an employment discrimination suit from filing a subsequent lawsuit to challenge hiring and promotion decisions made pursuant to the consent
tional Rights, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 2, at 274 (1990) (statement of Birmingham Mayor,
Richard Arrington, Jr.)).
182. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 51 (1991). One of Title
VII's goals is the encouragement of voluntary settlements as the preferred means of resolving
employment discrimination disputes. See Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515 (1986);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(b). The Wilks
rule allows a new employment discrimination suit to be filed against the employer every time
the employer hires or promotes an individual pursuant to an approved court decree, permitting
litigation to continue for years. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755. Why would an employer ever agree to
settle a Title VII case by means of a consent decree if the Wilks rule remains the law?
183. See Wilks, 490 U.S. at 765-68. Each and every potential litigant would have to be
served with a summons and would be required to obtain counsel in order to participate in the
full proceeding. Furthermore, many of those joined would not have intervened in the litigation
if the consent decree had the ability to remain unchallenged. See also H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d
Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 53-54 (1991).
184. This is particularly true where relief is sought against long-term systemic discrimination as was the case in Wilks.
185. Id. at 54 (1991). For example, a successful third party attack will invalidate the
original consent order, and the defendant will have to seek modification. If the judge who
originally entered the consent decree declines to modify it, the defendant will have irreconcilable obligations and will be subject to contempt citations by one or both of the courts. See The
Defeat of the Civil Rights Act of 1990: Wading through the rhetoric in Search of a Compromise, 44 VAND. L. REV. 595 (1991).
186. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 767-69.
187. Id. at 762 n.3.
188. Id. at 761-3.
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decree. 18 9 A five justice majority stated that where allegedly race

conscious promotion decisions were being made as a result of the
operation of a prior consent decree, white individuals, who were not
party to the proceedings which resulted in the entry of the decree,
could bring suit alleging that the denial of promotions to them was

due to impermissible considerations of race.1 90
B. Diametrically Opposed Responses in the Proposed Bills by
Congress and the Administration

H.R. 1 responds to both the overly restrictive rule that precludes all collateral attacks on consent decrees, and the overly expansive rule that permits a limitless number of collateral attacks as
evidenced by the Wilks decision. H.R. 1 is intended to promote the
speedy and final resolution of employment discrimination cases while
ensuring that nonparties, who may be adversely affected by a court
decree, have an adequate opportunity to challenge the decree.1 91
H.R. 1 promulgates three rules in order to provide uniform guidelines for when a challenge to a consent decree should be precluded. 2 First, a challenge to a decree is prohibited when the challenger has actual notice of the decree, its potential effects, and a
reasonable opportunity to present objections prior to the entry of the
decree. 19 3 The notice required is not provided by a particular party
189. Id. at 767. The court pointed out that Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribes permissive rather than mandatory intervention, and thus the appropriate mechanism to bind a party by judgment or consent decree is the mandatory joinder provision of
Rule 19(a). Id. at 764. Rule 19(a) provides that a person who has an interest in the subject of
the action must be joined if the person's absence either may impair the ability to protect that
person's interest or may subject existing parties to a "substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest." FED. R. Civ.
P. 19(a).
190. See 490 U.S. at 769 (affirming the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, see 490 U.S. at 761).
191. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 55 (1991).
192.

Id.

193. See H.R. 1, supra note I, § 104 (A)(i),(ii), 137 CoNG. REC. at H3923. Both elements of this preclusion rule, actual notice and a reasonable opportunity to object, are derived
from, and are consistent with, the fundamental requirements of the due process clause. The
landmark case describing the nature of these requirements is Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). There the court stated that:
[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process is any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections. The notice must be of such nature
as reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable
time for those interested to make their appearance. But if with due regard for the
practicalities and peculiarities of the case, these conditions are reasonably met, the
constitutional requirements are satisfied.
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or by the court itself. Rather, it may come from any source, provided
that the notice adequately apprises the recipient that the decree may
have an impact on his or her interests and that an opportunity to
object is available.19 ' Second, a challenge to a decree is precluded
when the court determines that the interests of the challenger were
already adequately represented by another person who did in fact
challenge the decree.'9 " Lastly, a challenge to a decree will be denied
when the court determines that reasonable efforts were made to provide notice to interested persons. 198
H.R. 1 enumerates a handful of exceptions to the preclusion
rules already discussed.1 7 The rules do not alter an individual's right
to intervene in an action pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 98 If an individual desires to challenge an employment practice that is enforced by a court decree, the right to intervene in the proceeding is maintained. However, the court determines
whether intervention is appropriate under Rule 24.91 Furthermore,
the preclusion rules do not apply to the "rights of parties to the action in which the litigated or consent judgment or order was entered,
or to members of a class represented or sought to be represented in
such action, or to members of a group on whose behalf relief was
sought in such action by the Federal Government. 20 0 The preclusion
rules do not prevent challenges to a court decree if it was obtained
through collusion or fraud, or is transparently invalid, 20 ' or was entered by a court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 0 2 Finally,
these rules do not permit the judicial system to deny any individual
Id. at 314-15.
194. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971). Determinations as to whether a particular type
or form of notice meets the requirements of this rule are to be made by the court on a case by
case basis.
195. See H.R. I, supra note 1, § 104 (B), 137 CONG. REc. at H3923. The term "adequately represented" is intended to have an analogous meaning to that of the term's use in
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "Due process permits the preclusion of other
litigants if their interests are sufficiently close to the interests of the parties." See Kramer,
Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties,87 MICH L. REV. 321, 350 (1988).
196. See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 104 (C), 137 CONG. REc. at H3923. See Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc., v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1988); NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 529-30 (1984).
197. See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 104 (2), 137 CONG. REC. at H3923.
198. Id. at § (2)(A).
199. Id.
200. Id. at § (2)(B).
201. Id. at § (2)(C). The term "transparently invalid" is intended to mean an agreement
that is unlawful on its face. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 59 n. 51 (1991).
202. See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 104 (2)(C), 137 CONG. REc. at H3923. See also H.R.
REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 59 (1991).
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the due process of law that is required by the United States
Constitution.0 3
By stark contrast, H.R. 1375 codifies the Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Wilks.2 °4 As a result, only the persons who were
parties to a consent decree will be bound by it.205 Opponents of H.R.
1 strongly believe that Wilks is consistent with the due process principle that everyone is entitled to his day in court. Therefore, the Administration argues that individuals should not be bound by a consent decree in which they had no opportunity to participate and
might not have had actual notice. 6 Although in a theoretical vacuum this may be a strong argument, in practice it is one of the
weaker arguments set forth by the Administration. Not only is the
long-standing concept of finality of judgments being ignored, more
importantly employers would be discouraged from voluntarily entering into these beneficial arrangements. 0 7 Employers would be subject to countless lawsuits if the decree could be challenged over and
over again; therefore, there would be no incentive for an employer to
foster resolution in a case of employment discrimination. A stronger
argument set forth by the opponents of H.R. 1 is that it is difficult
for an individual to anticipate how his or her interests will be affected by the decree at a future date, and therefore the option to
challenge a decree should always be available. 08 Moreover, the expense of hiring a lawyer may not be worth the mere anticipation of
discrimination without some further, actual indication. 20 9 As an alternative, proponents of H.R. 1375 argue that the mechanism of
joinder is available to prevent the repetitive challenge to these decrees. 2 0 This notion is completely inconsistent with prior arguments
which purport that individuals cannot anticipate how their interests
will be affected in the future, and that hiring a lawyer may not be
worth the expense if they have only a remote interest in the outcome
203. See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 104 (2)(D), 137 CONG. REc. at H3923. See also H.R.
REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 58 (1991).
204. See H.R. 1375, supra note I, § 5, 137 CONG. REc. at H1663.
205. Id.
206. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 140 (1991).
207. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 51-54 (1991).
208. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 140 (1991).
209. Opponents of H.R. I argue that the right to challenge a consent decree is consistent with the overturning of Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), see
infra notes 217-227 and accompanying text. In both instances, the legislation of H.R. 1375
does not require individuals to speculate about how their employment status may be impaired
at a future date, but rather allows the employment practice to be challenged when their interests are actually affected. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 140 (1991).
210. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 140-41 (1991).
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of the litigation. Why would these same individuals, who do not realize how their interests may be affected in the future and who may
have only a remote interest in the decree, decide to join the present
litigation by the mechanism of joinder?
V. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
AND THE RESPONSE OF CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION

A continuing violation of a discriminatory policy or practice
may permit a victim to file a timely charge even if the initial act
occurred outside the 180/300 filing limitation.2 ' A continuing violation is a series of discriminatory acts constituting a related course of
conduct or the maintenance of an unlawful policy or system. 12 In
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,1 3 the Supreme Court was
presented with a continuing violation theory in the seniority system
context. The plaintiffs in Lorance alleged that a seniority rule governing layoffs had been adopted for the purpose of discriminating
against women. 4 The rule, which was adopted in 1979, was first
applied in 1982 in order to demote Lorance and the other two plaintiffs. 2 5 The plaintiffs claimed that the 1979 seniority provision was
the product of a "conspir[acy] to change the seniority rules, in order
to protect incumbent male testers and to discourage women from
promoting into traditionally male tester jobs. ' ' 216 The Supreme Court
addressed the issue of when the limitations period begins to run for
filing charges that challenge a facially neutral, but intentionally discriminatory, seniority system. Does the limitations period start to
run from the date that an individual knows or has reason to know
that such a seniority system has been adopted, or does the period
begin to run when the seniority system is applied to the plaintiff in
question? A divided Supreme Court held that where an employer
adopts an employment rule for allegedly discriminatory reasons, the
limitations period begins to run as soon as the rule is adopted, not
211. See ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION. § 12.4(4)
(1990). Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988), a charge must be filed with the EEOC within
180 days of the alleged unfair employment practice unless the complainant has first instituted
proceedings with a state or local agency, in which the period is extended to a maximum of 300
days. Id.
212. Id.
213. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).

214. Id. at 903. The three women filed Title VII charges in 1983 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter EEOC), and after the EEOC issued right-tosue letters, the petitioners filed in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Id.
215.

Id. at 902.

216. Id. at 903.
217. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol9/iss1/4

30

Lilling: The Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Examination of the Storm Precedi
1991]

Compromise of Civil Rights

from the date that the seniority system is applied to the complaining
18
party.
The Committee and the Administration believe that there is a
need for legislation to overrule the Lorance decision. 219 "The
Lorance rule produces unnecessary litigation, and causes needless
strain on employment relationships." 220 "The Court [in Lorance] restrict[ed] Federal civil rights protections in a manner that was inconsistent with the intent of Congress." '' If an employee were
forced to anticipate the harm of a seniority system, he or she would
be forced to sue his employer before he had suffered any real injury
and perhaps would never have suffered any injury at all.222
H.R. 1 overturns Lorance by providing that the statute of limitations for filing a Title VII charge begins to run from the date on
which an unlawful employment practice "occurred or has been applied to affect adversely the person aggrieved, whichever is later. '223
This will assure that the Title VII limitations period will not begin to
run so soon that it becomes difficult or impossible for a victim of
discrimination to obtain the protection of the law. Clearly, this provision of the bill amending Title VII extends beyond the seniority system context and applies to many other discriminatory and inequitable employment practices. 2 4 By adopting a rule that is applicable to
all claims, the Committee intends to foster voluntary settlement
rather than encourage unnecessary litigation.225
H.R. 1375 provides that the limitations period for challenging a
discriminatory seniority system begins to run when "a seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a seniority
system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of a
seniority system .... -226 The scope of the provision is limited to the
seniority system context; therefore, it provides only a shell of the
protection than that of its counterpart in H.R. 1.2 27 Proponents of
H.R. 1375 argue that a seniority system is of particular concern with
218. Id. at 911.
219. See infra notes 220-229 and accompanying text.
220. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 60 (1991).
221. Id. at 61.
222. Id. at 61 (citing Brief for the United States at 8, 24, Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (No. 87-1428)); see also Johnson v. General Electric, 840 F.2d
132, 136 (1st Cir. 1988)(stating that "[i]t is unwise to encourage lawsuits . . . before it is

even certain that injuries will occur at all.").
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 105(a)(2), 137 CONG. REc. at H3924.
See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 62 (1991).
Id.
H.R. 1375, supra note 1, § 7, 137 CONG. REC. at H1663.
Id.
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respect to the statute of limitations, since such a system can be
adopted years before it has an impact on an employee's rights.22 8
The Administration's position is that other discriminatory employment practices do not pose such delayed impact problems as seniority systems; therefore, Title VII should be amended only with respect
to such systems and 9should not change the current law with respect
22
to all other claims.
Not only does H.R. 1 amend the triggering point of the statute
of limitations, it also provides for an extension of Title VII's limitation period.2 30 Title VII currently states that an employment discrimination claim must be filed within 180 days following the alleged
unlawful practice or within 300 days if the complainant has instituted proceedings with a state or local agency.2 31 At the same time,
42 U.S.C. Section 1981, which bars intentional race discrimination,
allows victims a considerably longer time period to commence an action. Generally the time period in which a complaining party must
institute an action is two to three years.23 2 Therefore, under current
law, those commencing an action for race discrimination under Section 1981 have a marked advantage over those women, minorities,
and members of other protected groups who must file their claims
within 180 days rather than within two years. Employment discrimination is not often easily recognizable when the practice is neutral on
its face, and once the infringement on one's rights is recognized, it
takes additional time to seek an appropriate remedy. Settlement
without litigation can only be encouraged if there is enough time to
attempt a peaceful remedy before having to institute court proceedings. Six months is not enough time to encourage voluntary settlement if the complaining party risks losing his right to have his case
adjudicated. Thus, six months is not an adequate time period for an
individual to realize and rectify the discrimination.
H.R. 1 amends Title VII to lengthen the limitations period for
filing employment discrimination charges from 180 days to 540 days
228. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 153 (1991).
229. Id.
230. See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 105(a)(1), 137 CONG. REC. at H3924; see infra notes
233-35 and accompanying text.
231. See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(e) (1988).
232. Since section 1981 does not explicitly provide for a limitations period, courts have
looked to analogous state statutes of limitations. State statute of limitations, while it varies by
state, is typically two or three years. See e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656
(1987)(two years); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)(two years); Gordon v. Nat'l
Youth Work Alliance, 675 F.2d 356 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(three years).
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(18 months).23 3 H.R. 1375, on the other hand, does not provide for
any extension of the filing period, and proponents of the Administration's bill argue that the lengthening of the period will not only hinder the settlement process, it will also be disadvantageous to the employer because documents will be lost and memories will fade.234
These concerns have been addressed by the Committee. They have
stated that numerous employment discrimination claims have been
brought under section 1981, and there has been no evidence that the
two year limitation period interferes with the settlement process or
creates any evidentiary difficulties. 35
VI.

42 U.S.C. SECTION 1981: RESTORING THE PROHIBITION OF

DISCRIMINATION DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS

For over a century, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.
Section 1981 has protected black and other minority Americans

from racial discrimination in public and private contractual relations.236 Section 1981 provides in pertinent part that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts . . . and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and

proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens. .... 137
In the past two decades, section 1981 has emerged as one of our
nation's most important employment discrimination laws.238 The
statute is of particular importance for many reasons. First, section
1981 is the only federal law banning race discrimination in all contracts. As such, it has been a critically important tool used to strike
down racially discriminatory practices in a wide variety of situations,
including in the employment discrimination context.239 Second, unlike Title VII, which applies only to employers with 15 or more employees, section 1981 covers employers of all sizes. 24 0 Thus, it is the
233. See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 105(a)(1), 137 CONG. REC. at H3924.
234. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 64 (1991).
235. Id.
236. See e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,168 (1976); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce,
829 F.2d 1343, 1349 (5th Cir. 1987); Wyatt v. Security Inn Food & Beverage, Inc., 819 F.2d
69 (4th Cir. 1987).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
238. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 91 (1991).
239. Id. at 91 (listing instances such as jury service, voting rights, access to country
clubs, admissions to schools and hospitals, and rental housing).
240. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
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only federal law banning race discrimination applicable to the 3.7
million firms with fewer than 15 employees. 41 Third, section 1981
authorizes courts to choose to award equitable relief, compensatory
damages, or in appropriate cases, punitive damages as well.242 Finally, the statute of limitations in section 1981 cases is the applicable state tort statute of limitations, usually two years, while the stat2 43
ute of limitations in Title VII cases is only 180 days.
In 1989, the Supreme Court sharply restricted the safeguards of
section 1981 in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.244 The Court
adopted a very narrow interpretation of section 1981 by holding that
the provision applies only to discrimination in "the formation of a
contract, . . . not to problems that may arise later from the condi-

tions of continuing employment. 2 45 As a result, post-contract formation conduct, such as racial harassment is no longer prohibited by
section 1981. In Patterson,the court relied on the fact that the type
of conduct it held not to be actionable under section 1981 was already prohibited by Title VII.2 46 The Court reasoned that because
the conduct was forbidden by Title VII, there was no need to
broadly interpret section 1981 to cover the same conduct. The court
further stated that "the right to make contracts does not extend...
to conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition
of discriminatory working conditions. 247
Prior to the Patterson ruling, every federal court of appeals had
held that section 1981 prohibits not just discrimination at the formation of an employment contract, but discrimination during the per241.

See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 91 (1991).

242.
243.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
See supra at note 211 and accompanying text.

244. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). In May of 1972, Brenda Patterson, a black woman, was hired
by McLean Credit Union as a teller and a file coordinator. Id. at 169. In July of 1982, Brenda

was laid off. After her termination, she filed an action claiming that her employer, in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, had harassed her, failed to promote her, and discharged her, all because

of her race. Id. Both the District Court and Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's claim of
racial harassment was not actionable under section 1981. Id.

While instances of racial harassment may implicate the terms and conditions of
employment under Title VII . . . and of course may be probative of the discriminatory intent required to be shown in a § 1981 action . . . racial harassment itself is
not cognizable under § 1981 because racial harassment does not abridge the right to
make and enforce contracts.
Id. at 170 (citing the Court of Appeals decision at 805 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (1986)).
245. Id. at 176.

246. Id. at 177, 179-80.
247.

Id.
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formance of the contract as well.2 48 As a result of Patterson'slimited

holding, many victims of race discrimination may not obtain compensatory or punitive damages under section 1981 and thus may lack

any means to obtain relief for the harms they have sustained. Under
Title VII, remedies are currently limited to equitable relief, such as

reinstatement and up to two years back pay.249 These remedies are

often inappropriate for intentional discrimination since many victims
remain in their jobs, and thus suffer no loss of income. 50 Therefore,
no adequate deterrent exists to prevent these highly offensive forms
of discrimination. Since Patterson, hundreds of claims of race dis-

crimination have been dismissed by federal courts as a result of this
decision.2 51 Most importantly, individuals who comprise a workplace
of fewer than 15 employees have been stripped of their protections
against race discrimination.252
Both H.R. 1 and H.R. 1375 overrule the narrow and destructive
248. See Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 201-03 (lst Cir. 1987) (discrimination in training, wages, and discharge); Richards v. New York City Board of Education, 668 F. Supp. 259, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (discriminatory denial of promotion), aff d without opinion, 842 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1988); Liotta v. Nat'l Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903, 906 (3d
Cir. 1980) (reversing summary judgment for employer on discriminatory discharge claim),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 262 (4th
Cir. 1976) (discriminatory promotion practices); Hernandez v. Hill Country Telephone Cooperative, Inc., 849 F.2d 139, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1988) (discriminatory denial of promotion);
Grubb v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hospital, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 671, 675-76 (E.D. Mich . 1981)
(discriminatory discharge; supervisor told black employee that "a black man has no business
supervising white women"), aff'd, 759 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 946
(1985); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986) (employer violated section 1981 by engaging in "a vicious campaign of racial harassment" and by discharging employee in retaliation for employee's discrimination complaint); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d
1193, 1198-99 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding employer liable for work place atmosphere "heavily
charged with racial discrimination," including pervasive use of racial slurs and epithets, physical violence and hanging of a noose to intimidate black employees); Satterwhite v. Smith, 744
F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984) (discriminatory working conditions); Foster v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 773 F.2d 1116, 1120 (10th Cir. 1985) (discriminatory discharge); Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1433 (1 Ith Cir. 1985) (discriminatory promotion practices);
Metrocare v. WMATA, 679 F.2d 922, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (discriminatory downgrading of
job).
249. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
250. In a wide range of cases, only an award of monetary damages will make a victim
whole for physical, emotional, or economic injury resulting from race discrimination. See infra
notes 264-273 and accompanying text.
251. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 91 (1991) (citing Statement
of Julius LeVonne Chambers, Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc.(March 9, 1990)).
252. Since Title VII extends its protections only to a workplace of 15 or more employees, see supra at note 240, and Patterson interpreted that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not protect
against racial discrimination during the performance of a contract. Id. Consequently, those
individuals who are at a workplace of fewer than 15 employees have been stripped of their
protection against racial discrimination.
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decision in Patterson v McLean Credit Union. 253 Both bills provide
that the right to "make and enforce contracts" free from race discrimination includes "the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship. 254 Both
H.R. 1 and H.R 1375 amend section 1981 so that it would prohibit
racial discrimination in all aspects of employment.255 In addition,
both bills codify the long prevailing standard in Runyon v. McCrary,5 that section 1981 covers private as well as governmental
conduct. 51 As a result, racial employment discrimination can be
combatted by claims of harassment, discharge, demotion, promotion,
and transfer under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981.258
VII.

TITLE

VII

REMEDIES IN CASES OF INTENTIONAL
DISCRIMINATION

A.

The Current Remedial Scheme Under Title VII: Is it
Adequate?
Title VII does not authorize the recovery of compensatory or
punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination on the basis
of gender, religion, or national origin. 259 Rather, the remedial structure provides for equitable relief, including injunctive relief, reinstatement or hiring, with up to two years' back pay in such employment discrimination cases. 260 At the same time, federal civil rights
253. See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 110, 137 CONG. REC. at H3924; H.R. 1375, supra
note 1, § 6, 137 CONG. REC. at H1663.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
257. Id.
258. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 92 (1991).
259. Compensatory damages unavailable: see, e.g., Walker v. Stuttgart School Dist., 787
F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1986); Padway v. Patches, 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982); DeGrace v.
Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796 (Ist Cir. 1980); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585
F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979).
Punitive Damages unavailable: see, e.g., White v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys.,
692 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982); Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1977); Pearson v.
Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1976); Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 528
F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
260. The relief provision in Title VII provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in . . .an unlawful
employment practice . . . the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
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law under 42 U.S. C. Section 1981 permits the recovery of an unlimited amount of compensatory, and in some instances, punitive damages in cases of intentional race discrimination.261 No matter how
demoralizing the circumstances, victims of intentional gender and religious discrimination cannot receive compensatory or punitive damages. 262 Moreover, Title VII contains a mitigation clause that often
may neutralize the deterrent effect of the back pay award. It provides that "[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable
diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. '26 3 Courts have
stringently interpreted this clause to mean that the plaintiff must exercise reasonable efforts to seek employment of an equivalent nature
or the complainant will not be entitled to any back pay.264
The Committee believes that Congress should not differentiate
2 65
between victims of race and all other victims of discrimination.
Victims of sexual or religious harassment often endure terrible humiliation, pain, and suffering while on the job. The distress often
manifests itself in emotional disorders and medical problems, which
in turn cause victims of discrimination to suffer substantial medical
expense as well as other economic losses. 66 Since Title VII does not
permit recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, not only are
victims unable to make themselves whole for their losses, they are
also discouraged from seeking to exonerate their civil rights.2 67
The factual scenario in Zabkowicz v. West Bend Company," 8 is
illustrative of the inadequacies of Title VII's current remedial
scheme. The plaintiff was subjected to continuous sexual harassment
261.

See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).

262.
263.
264.

See supra at note 260.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 485 U.S. 219, 232 (1982).

265. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 65 (1991).
266. See Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 44 F.E.P. Cas (BNA) 1119, 1122 (N.D. Ill. 1987),
affd in relevant part, 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989); Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine,

805 F.2d 528, 535 (5th Cir. 1986).
267. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., IstSess., pt. 1, at 70 (1991) (citing Mitchell v.
OsAir, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 636, 643 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
There is little incentive for a plaintiff to bring a Title VII suit when the best that
she can hope for is an order to her supervisor and to her employer to treat her with
the dignity she deserves and the costs of bringing her suit. One can expect that a
potential claimant will pause long before enduring the humiliation of making public
the indignities which she has suffered in private . . .when she is precluded from
recovering damages for her perpetrators' behavior.

Id.
268.

589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984), affd in part, rev'd on other grounds, 789 F.2d

540 (7th Cir. 1986).
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for a period of more than three years.2"' According to Zabkowicz's
testimony before the Committee, during those three years her coworkers regularly exposed themselves in front of her, propositioned
her, and posted dozens of obscene drawings of her having sex with
other people or with animals.2 70 As a result of this constant egregious behavior, she suffered from vomiting, severe nausea, diarrhea,
and cramping. 71 When the complainant was pregnant her doctor advised her that for the sake of her health and the health of her child
she had to take a medical leave of absence from work. 72 The court
concluded that she was the victim of "sustained, vicious, and brutal
harassment" which was both "malevolent and outrageous" and
which harmed her health.273 Although the court was willing to acknowledge this offensive behavior, they could award her only $2, 736
in back pay for her two month absence from work during her pregnancy. 274 Unfortunately, instances of sexual harassment in our society occur quite frequently in the workplace. Without the protective
cloak of compensatory and punitive damages, all too often victims
will be left without adequate remedies for their injuries. An employer, without the threat of substantial monetary liability, will not
be discouraged from intentionally discriminating since the potential
penalties are not severe enough to serve as a deterrent for their offensive and inexcusable actions.
B. Congress and the Administration Sharply Disagree on How
to Revise Title VII's Remedial Scheme
H.R. 1 would dramatically alter the current remedial scheme by
permitting courts to award compensatory damages, jury trials, and
punitive damages for intentional violations of Title VII. 275 Compensatory damages may be awarded for harms such as humiliation, pain
and suffering, psychological and physical abuse, medical expenses,
and other relevant out-of-pocket expenses.276 Punitive damages may
be awarded if the defendant engaged in the unlawful practice with
malice, or with reckless or callous indifference to the federally pro269. Id.
270. See Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 4000 Before the House Comm. on
Educationand Labor and the House JudiciarySubcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., (March, 13 1990) (statement of Carol Zabkowicz).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Zabkowicz, 589 F. Supp. at 784.
274. Id.
275. See H.R. 1, supra note I, § 106, 137 CONG. REC. at H3924.
276. See H.R. REP. No. 644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 75 (1990).
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tected rights of others. 2 The amount of punitive damages, however,
shall not exceed $150,000 or an amount equal to the sum of compensatory damages awarded and the equitable monetary relief, whichever is greater.2 Proponents of H.R. 1 believe that individuals who
are subject to intentional gender or religious discrimination, for example, finally deserve the same opportunity to be made whole as
those in the case of racial discrimination. 7 9 Lastly, to protect the
rights of all persons under the Seventh Amendment, the bill also
stipulates that in cases where compensatory or punitive damages280
are
sought under Title VII, any party may demand a trial by jury.
It is important to recognize that jury trials and damages would
not be an option in disparate impact or mixed motive cases.281 This
new remedial scheme would only be applicable in disparate treatment instances, and therefore it would not impose an unfair burden
on employers since they already assume the burden in cases of intentional race discrimination. Although there is a chance that a small
business employer may be held liable for a large sum of monetary
damages, this possibility should not be a justification for intentional
and offensive discrimination. The threat of being liable for money
damages is the most effective deterrent that the system can impose
in order to defeat such egregious harms. 82 Therefore, the employer
is encouraged to prevent such discriminatory behavior before it occurs. 23 Back pay, the only monetary remedy under Title VII, is not
only an ineffective deterrent, it is often times a non-existent punishment. Employees who are subject to such harassment often remain
on the job, and as a result, they lose their right to any
compensation.284
The Administration is strongly opposed to the remedial scheme
set forth in the congressional bill. The Administration's bill amends
Title VII to codify a cause of action for workplace harassment on
the basis of race, sex, color, religion, sex, or national origin as does
H.R. 1; however, the bill requires that an employee must first attempt to resolve the alleged harassment through an employer inter277.

H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 106(B), 137 CONG. REC. at H3924.

278. Id. at § 106(2)(A),(B).
279. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 65 (1991).
280. See H.R. 1, supra note 1, § 106(B), 137 CONG. REC. at H3924.
281. Id.
282. See Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986) (stating that "the damages a
plaintiff recovers contribute significantly to the deterrence of civil rights violations in the

future").
283. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 70 (1991).
284.

See supra at notes 268-274 and accompanying text.
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nal mechanism which is designed to effectively address such
problems within 90 days.28 5 The bill allows for the recovery of equitable relief, although the maximum that can be awarded is
$150,000.281 As an alternative a plaintiff can also choose to seek
prompt preliminary injunctive relief from the court in order to stop
the demoralizing activity. 87 H.R. 1375 does not expressly provide
for jury trials; however, in the unlikely event that a court requires a
jury trial on the issue of liability, the judge will determine the
amount of monetary damages. 8
The Administration has set forth several reasons why the congressional expansion of Title VII remedies is neither justifiable nor
prudent. First, the Administration believes that the $150,000 cap
that is placed on punitive damages is misleading because that cap
can be inflated if the amount of compensatory damages awarded,
including pain and suffering plus equitable relief (back pay), is
greater than $150,000.289 Therefore, the cap would act as a floor
rather than a ceiling, and an employer could be held liable for hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars. The threat of enormous liability will prompt employers to "correct" any imbalances in
the workplace by hiring and promoting by the numbers rather than
by individual merit.2 90 Second, the Administration argues that "Title
VII will be transformed from a statute rightfully oriented to the
quick resolution of disputes and prompt reinstatement of the employee to his or her proper position-with quick economic relief for
lost wages-to a litigation generating machine which will only benefit lawyers ..

.""I Title VII, the proponents of H.R. 1375 argue,

was enacted for the goals of ending the discrimination, resolving the
underlying dispute through efforts of conciliation with the assistance
of the EEOC, repairing the employment relationship, reinstating the
employee into his or her rightful position, and providing for equitable remedies, including lost wages, lost benefits, and attorneys
fees.292 The Administration believes that these remedies provide adequate deterrence, and there is no need to expand Title VII for the
purpose of punishing the employer through tort-like remedies of
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

See H.R. 1375, supra note 1, § 8(3), 137 CONG. REc. at H1663.
Id. at § 8(m)(1).
Id. at § 8(1).
Id. at § 8(m)(2).
See 137 Cong. Rec. at H3944.
See supra at note 38.
H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 147(1991).
Id. at 144.
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compensatory and punitive damages.193 And third, the Administration argues that 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, which provides for compensatory and punitive damages, is a "broad civil rights statute" passed

by Congress shortly after the Civil War to prevent racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts in a wide variety of

situations.

4

Opponents of H.R. 1 clearly maintain that section 1981

was not and is not intended to be an employment discrimination

statute.295
Indeed, it was not until the early 1970's, a hundred years after its
enactment, that the courts judicially decided that the law even applied to private-sector employment discrimination. 296 The law's
proper applicability to employment discrimination has, thus, never
been thoroughly considered by Congress. Indeed, if the cry of "parity" is to be the standard before which all other arguments must
fall, then one might ask the proponents of H.R. 1 why section 1981
should necessarily be the standard by which "proper" remedies are
7
measured. 29
VIII. CONCLUSION

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is sorely needed to remedy the
numerous and inconsistent judicial interpretations of employment
discrimination law. Moreover, victims of intentional and demoralizing employment discrimination deserve a remedial scheme under Title VII which provides adequate compensation for their injuries.
Whether the inconsistencies will be decided in favor of the business
community or in favor of the individual is the pressing issue surrounding the debate over this legislation. Without question, a suita293. Id.
294. See supra at note 239.
295. "No existing labor law statute provides for punitive and compensatory damages.
Most are limited to, as in Title VII, injunctive relief and lost pay and benefits ..... Id. at
146.
296. The Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Railway Express, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), decided
for the first time that section 1981 covered private employment discrimination.
297. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 146-47(1991). In response to the
opponents of H.R. 1, it should be noted that when 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was enacted over 100
years ago, Congress did not anticipate, let alone consider, section 1981 as a tool to gain access
into private country clubs; however, the statute has been used for this and many other unanticipated purposes which were not considered at the time of its codification. See supra note 137.
The statute does not provide an all-inclusive list of instances in which its protections may be
invoked; therefore, there is no justifiable reason why the statute should not be used in the
employment discrimination context. Title VII had been in effect for only 10 years at the time
of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson. The Court realized that Title VII does not always
provide an adequate remedy for victims of discrimination.
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ble compromise must be reached in order to combat the inequities of
the current statutory and judicial framework. Compromise, however,
when utilized in the political and economic arena is often an ineffective solution. Furthermore, the use of compromise in the context of
civil rights legislation is often an unsettling notion. It is frightening
to the individual who seeks protection, and it is disturbing to the
business community which desires the freedom to run its operations
as it deems efficient and profitable. However, in this case, compromise is clearly the only viable alternative. Neither bill in its current
form is acceptable to either polarized group. More importantly,
neither bill in its current form will be embraced by both the employees and employers. One of these groups will suffer if either proposal
is codified. Therefore, it is important to understand each party's
viewpoint, in order to appreciate their mutual concessions.
The formation of a fair and effective compromise bill will not be
an easy task. However, the consequences of not having new civil
rights legislation will be far more damaging than the effects of
reaching a middle ground between the two factions. Both Congress
and the Administration should take steps toward agreement; however, each must be willing to recognize the merit behind the other's
arguments. 98 It is vital that civil rights laws adequately protect individuals from discriminatory employment practices on the basis of
race, color, gender, religion, or national origin. Yet, of equal importance, is the right of the business community to freely engage in
employment decision-making processes without being constantly
threatened by the prospect of long and prohibitively expensive
litigation.
Caryn Leslie Lilling

298. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, S. 1745, was signed into law by President Bush on
November 21, 1991. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (1991).
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